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DO INSTITUTIONAL OWNERS MONITOR?
EVIDENCE FROM VOTING ON
CONNECTED TRANSACTION
PROPOSALS IN HONG KONG-
LISTED COMPANIES
Dr. Félix E. Mezzanotte* and Simon Fung**
The conventional view in Hong Kong has been that institutional owners
tend to be passive owners and that they do little to monitor the companies’
management.  We investigated whether the presence of institutional owners
in Hong Kong-listed companies was associated with greater monitoring of
management through dissent voting by hand-collecting information for a
sample (n= 96) of connected transaction proposals (“CT proposals”) and
of their voting outcomes, as announced in the Stock Exchange of Hong
Kong during the period from 2012–14.  Our study shows that voting ap-
proval rates on CT proposals were lower (i.e. greater dissent voting) when
institutional owners had at least 5 percent shareholdings and when the CT
proposals were likely to expropriate or when the company holding the vote
did not have a controlling shareholder.  These findings support the view
that the presence of institutional ownership in Hong Kong can be consis-
tent with monitoring effects and, to that extent, with good governance.
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INTRODUCTION
This article reports findings from our investigation of whether the pres-
ence of institutional owners (“IOs”) in Hong Kong-listed companies has
been associated with greater monitoring of management through dissent
voting in general meetings.  The results of this investigation are important
for Hong Kong and other global markets.
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Institutional investors own roughly 70 percent of the equity in the top
thousand listed companies in the United States.1  In the countries member
of Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
the largest asset in the portfolio of traditional institutional investors (nota-
bly, pension funds, investment funds, and insurance companies) has been
shares in listed companies.  The total assets managed by those investors
more than doubled from 2000 to 2011, growing from USD 36 trillion to
USD 73.4 trillion.2  In turn, the percentage of equity owned directly by
physical investors in US listed companies fell from 84 percent to around 40
percent between 1963 and 2011.  Similarly, in the United Kingdom, equity
owned directly by physical investors in listed companies fell from 54 per-
cent to 11 percent from 1963 to 2012. In Japan, 2011 figures show physical
persons owning only 18 percent of all public equity.3  Institutional inves-
tors have also achieved a strong presence in the Hong Kong Stock Ex-
change.  They were responsible for 60 percent of market turnover in the
last decade (in terms of 2005–2015 cumulative securities market turnover);
whereas retail investors accounted for roughly 25 percent of market turno-
ver.4  With IOs showing an increasingly important presence in listed com-
panies, a key question has been to what extent IOs have influenced the
governance of these companies.
More specifically, it has not been evident whether and how IOs have
exercised their monitoring function, especially through voting rights.  The
exercise of voting rights has been recognized as an important principle of
stewardship in a growing number of countries around the world.5  This
principle has more recently been embraced in Hong Kong.  In evaluating
the creation of new principles of responsible ownership, the Hong Kong
Securities and Futures Commission (“SFC”) stated, “Given the signifi-
cance of their holdings [holdings of institutional investors in HK], the way
in which such institutional shareholders use their rights is of fundamental
importance to the health and stability of an investee company and ulti-
1. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism:
Activist Investors and the Reevaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863
(2011); David Yermack, Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance, 2 ANN. REV. OF FIN.
ECON. 103–25 (2010).
2. Serdar Çelik & Mats Isaksson, Institutional Investors as Owners: Who Are They
and What Do They Do? 10–11 (Org. for Econ. Coop’n and Dev. Corp. Governance, Working
Paper No. 11, 2013).
3. Id. at 7.
4. See HKEX, CASH MARKET TRANSACTIONS SURVEY 2014/15, https://
www.hkex.com.hk/eng/stat/research/Documents/cmts2015.pdf.
5. ICGN, Global Stewardship Principles (2016), https://www.icgn.org/policy/steward-
ship-codes; OECD, Principles of Corporate Governance (2004), http://www.oecd.org/corpo-
rate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf; OECD, Reform Priorities in Asia:
Taking Corporate Governance to a Higher Level (2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/
49801431.pdf; see generally PRI Association, The Six Principles, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSI-
BLE INV., https://www.unpri.org/about/the-six-principles.
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mately to our economy.”6  Those rights include the right to participate and
to vote in the investee’s general meetings.7
Shareholder approval in general meetings—an ex ante control mecha-
nism of corporate governance—can be of great importance in Hong Kong
given the constraints currently observed in the enforcement ex-post. In
this sense, the investigations conducted by the Securities and Futures
Commission (“SFC”)—the capital markets regulator in Hong Kong—have
been contained by limited resources and by the SFC’s mandate covering a
range of objectives. Although the SFC does monitor the state of corporate
governance in listed companies (eg. by conducting investigations under
section 214 Securities and Futures Ordinance [Cap. 571] (“SFO”)), a large
proportion of the SFC’s enforcement efforts have concentrated in the
prosecution of (mis)conducts of licensed intermediaries, including brokers,
asset managers and investment advisors, among others, under the SFO
and the several codes of conduct.  Class actions are unavailable in Hong
Kong, while derivative actions brought by company members have largely
operated in the ambit of private firms due to restrictions on the plaintiff’s
legal standing to bring lawsuits in relation to listed companies and the
presence of economic disincentives for plaintiffs to sue.8
Although voting is a critical channel for IOs to engage with their inves-
tee companies—and this is the channel our investigation has focused on—
engagement may occur in other various ways.  As well documented in re-
cent literature, IOs have engaged through private dialogue or through in-
formal talks with directors and/or managers.  McCahery, Sautner, and
Starks found a widespread use of private discussions as engagement chan-
nels and concluded that “investors first try to engage firms behind the
scenes through direct negotiations, and take measures (e.g., shareholder
proposals, public criticism [or dissent voting]) only after these private in-
terventions have failed.”9
Dimson, Karakas, and Li also revealed evidence of institutional inves-
tors’ engagement with the investee companies regarding social corporate
responsibility done through private dialogue via letters, e-mails, telephone
conversations, and direct conversations with senior management.10  Albeit
an extreme form, litigation by IOs against the investee company has also
been identified as a form of engagement.11  IOs may simply choose, more-
6. SEC. AND FUTURES COMM’N OF H.K., CONSULTATION PAPER ON THE PRINCIPLES
OF RESPONSIBLE OWNERSHIP ¶ 5 (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gate
way/EN/consultation/.
7. See id. ¶¶ 15, 51.
8. Félix E. Mezzanotte, The Unconvincing Rise of the Statutory Derivative Action in
Hong Kong: Evidence from its first Ten Years of Enforcement, 17 J. CORP. L. STUD. 469, 496
(2017).
9. Joseph A. McCahery et al., Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Prefer-
ences of Institutional Investors, 71 J. FIN. 2912, 2932 (2016).
10. Elroy Dimson et al., Active Ownership, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 3225, 3227 (2015).
11. McCahery et al., supra note 9.
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over, to sell their shares and exit (divest from) the investee company.12
This threat to exit has often been used as a bargaining tool, as has public
criticism of investee companies.13
Within the frame of the general meetings, IOs may resort to activism
through the submission of their own proposals for voting.  Shareholder-
sponsored proposals have worked as a vehicle for shareholders to convey
their expectations to the board and to top management.  The use and ef-
fectiveness of shareholder-sponsored proposals have been investigated ex-
tensively in US public companies as a form of shareholder activism.14  In
general meetings, shareholders may also vote against proposals submitted
by managers (management-sponsored proposals).  These proposals are
typically submitted to a shareholder vote as a necessary step in the process
of corporate decision-making, and the result of the shareholder vote is
binding.
In the context of management-sponsored proposals, shareholders who
are entitled to vote on the proposal can constrain managerial conduct
(monitoring effects) by voting in dissent or by eventually vetoing the pro-
posal.15  Management-sponsored proposals may include, among other pro-
posals: the election or removal of company directors or auditors, executive
compensation, allotment of shares, share buy-backs, and related-party
transactions. McCahery, Sautner and Starks reported that 53 percent of
respondents (surveying 143 corporate governance experts from different
countries) recognized in dissent voting a shareholder engagement mea-
sure.16  Iliev et al. have also provided evidence on the importance of the
general meeting and on dissent voting as a monitoring mechanism in a
non-US context.17
12. Robert Parrino et al., Voting with their Feet: Institutional Ownership Changes
Around Forced CEO Turnover, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2003).
13. McCahery et al., supra note 9.
14. Lilli Gordon & John Pound, Information, Ownership Structure, and Shareholder
Voting: Evidence from Shareholder-Sponsored Corporate Governance, 48 J. FIN. 697 (1993);
Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Stars, Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activ-
ism: The Role of Institutional Investors, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 275 (2000); Jonathan M. Karpoff et
al., Corporate Governance and Shareholder Initiatives: Empirical Evidence, 42 J. FIN. ECON.
365 (1996); Randall S. Thomas & James F. Cotter, Shareholder Proposals in the New Millen-
nium: Shareholder Support, Board Response, and Market Reaction, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 368
(2007); Yonca Ertimur et al., Board of Directors’ Responsiveness to Shareholders: Evidence
from Shareholder Proposals, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 53 (2010).
15. See generally James A. Brickley et al., Ownership Structure and Voting on An-
titakeover Amendments, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 267 (1988); James A. Brickley et al., Corporate
Voting: Evidence from Charter Amendment Proposals, 1 J. CORP. FIN. 5 (1994); Timothy R.
Burch et al., Is Acquiring-Firm Shareholder Approval in Stock-for-Stock Mergers Perfunc-
tory?, 33 FIN. MGMT. 45 (2004); See, Lilian Ng et al., Does Shareholder Approval Require-
ment of Equity Compensation Plans Matter?, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 1510 (2011).
16. McCahery et al. supra note 9, at 2912.
17. See Peter Iliev et. al., Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance Around the
World, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 2167 (2015).
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Although both managers and activist shareholders can submit propos-
als to shareholder votes, this investigation will focus on management-spon-
sored proposals.  The evidence of monitoring effects in this context has
been mixed.  Some evidence suggests that IOs have constrained manage-
rial conduct insomuch as IOs have utilized their voting rights to convey
dissent or dissatisfaction.18  In contrast, other evidence points to managers
controlling the voting process, while IOs abstain from voting or vote in
accord with management.19  A number of studies have identified monitor-
ing effects in more specific settings such as when IOs took the form of
mutual funds20 or were foreign institutions.21  This article will contribute
to this debate—built largely on US- or OECD-based evidence—by pro-
viding evidence of IOs and voting outcomes in HK-listed companies.
There has currently been little investigation about the extent to which
IOs have influenced voting outcomes in HK-listed companies.  Testing this
relationship empirically has been difficult.  Whether IOs attend general
meetings and vote—and the direction of this vote cast—cannot be readily
observed in Hong Kong as data on the voting activity and data on deci-
sions of IOs operating locally have not been made publicly available
(there has been no disclosure obligation in relation to the voting records of
IOs in Hong Kong).  Despite this caveat, valuable insights can still be
drawn by looking at how measures of institutional ownership levels and of
voting outcomes in general meeting correlate.
To this end, data of voting outcomes on a sample (n = 96) of connected
transaction proposals (“CT proposals”) announced in the Stock Exchange
of Hong Kong (SEHK) and of levels of ownership held by institutions in
the issuers of those CT proposals were collected.  Approval rate levels
resulting from the voting of the CT proposals was utilized as a proxy for
monitoring (lower approval rates are associated with greater dissent vot-
ing and, hence, with greater monitoring).  Groups with and without institu-
tional ownership were identified and voting approval rates compared
between these two groups.
Connected transactions (“CTs”) are transactions between the company
and an insider such as the company’s director(s), chief executive officer or
substantial shareholder.  CTs are important for corporate governance be-
18. See generally Brickley et al., supra note 15; Ng et al., supra note 15; Cf. Gregg A.
Jarrell et al., Shark Repellents and Stock Prices: The Effects of Antitakeover Amendments
Since 1980, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 127 (1987) (discussing shareholder resistance to traditional anti-
takeover amendments which entrench incumbent management).
19. Burch et al., supra note 15; See Assaf Hamdani & Yishay Yafeh, Institutional Inves-
tors as Minority Shareholders, 17 REV. FIN. 691 (2013); see also Abe de Jong et al., Sharehold-
ers’ Voting at General Meetings: Evidence from the Netherlands, 10 J. MGMT. &
GOVERNANCE 353 (2006).
20. Zhihong Chen et al., Minority Shareholders’ Control Rights and the Quality of Cor-
porate Decisions in Weak Investor Protection Countries: A Natural Experiment from China,
88 ACCT. REV. 1211 (2013).
21. Miguel A. Ferreira & Pedro Matos, The Colors of Investors’ Money: The Role of
Institutional Investors Around the World, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 499 (2008).
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cause they have been used in the past as a vehicle for expropriating minor-
ity shareholders in Hong Kong.22  Taking this critical feature into account
in our investigation, comparisons were also made in a setting where CT
proposals were more or less likely to expropriate minority shareholders.
Here, IOs—largely occupying the role of minority shareholders or outsid-
ers in Hong Kong-listed companies—face expropriation risk and can con-
sequently be expected to influence voting outcomes more significantly
than when such a risk is absent.  In this setting, one would expect compa-
nies with IOs be associated with lower approval rates of CT proposals than
companies without IOs.
The presence of a controlling shareholder can also be a relevant factor
in terms of the role and impact of IOs in a company’s governance. Com-
parisons were thus also made in a setting where a company has or not a
controlling shareholder. In this sense, the current assumption has been
that IOs have little or no weight in the voting outcomes of Hong Kong-
listed companies because a high percentage of these companies have been
dominated by controlling shareholders or controlling families.  These con-
trolling shareholders and families leave meager room for minority share-
holders—including IOs—to have a say in the outcome of company
decisions.23  The resulting state of affairs implies that IOs in Hong Kong
tend to be passive owners or, when disagreement arises, they exit the com-
pany instead of informally approaching management or instead of exercis-
ing their voting rights.
Findings from this investigation show, on average, that the presence of
IOs was irrelevant to voting approval rates.  However, when institutional
ownership levels were high (at least 5 percent shareholdings) the presence
of IOs had a greater effect on these rates, especially, when CT proposals
were more likely to expropriate or the company did not have a controlling
shareholder.  In this latter result, the fact that CT proposals must be ap-
proved in general meeting by the vote of disinterested shareholders—
which strengthens the voice of outsiders relative to that of insiders—could
not compensate for the presence of a controlling shareholder in the com-
pany.  This result is surprising to the extent that, on average, a sizable 44
percent of the outstanding shares abstained from voting due to the pres-
ence of material interest.  This outcome casts doubt on the effectiveness of
the ‘disinterested’ shareholder voting mechanism to empower minority
shareholders, including IOs, in firms having a controlling shareholder.
22. Say H. Goo & Rolf H. Weber, The Expropriation Game: Minority Shareholders’
Protection, 33 H.K. L.J. 71 (2003); see Janice C. Y. How et al., Dividends and Expropriation
in Hong Kong, 4 ASIAN ACAD. MGMT. J. ACCT. & FIN 71 (2008); Adrian C. H. Lei & Frank
M. Song, Connected Transactions and Firm Value: Evidence from China-affiliated Compa-
nies, 19 PACIFIC-BASIN FIN. J. 470 (2011); Yan-Leung Cheung et al., Tunneling, Propping and
Expropriation. Evidence from Connected Party Transactions in Hong Kong, 82 J. FIN. ECON.
343 (2006).
23. See Goo & Weber, supra note 22, at 73.
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The monitoring effects by IOs at the stage of voting in general meeting
identified in this article were probably understated in the regression analy-
sis due to several factors that could not be observed including pre-vote
negotiations, selection bias in the sense that only the most benign CT pro-
posals were submitted to shareholder vote, or disgruntled shareholders’
exit following the CT announcement.  Despite these factors, and the mod-
est levels of institutional ownership found in the sample companies (9 per-
cent on average), it is surprising that monitoring effects were nonetheless
captured in the regression.
It is important to note that monitoring effects in our investigation
emerged not from the veto of CT proposals but merely from dissent vot-
ing.  To that extent, the identified effects can be construed as representing
no more than a signal of disapproval or dissatisfaction.  It is unclear
whether dissent voting led to subsequent changes in governance of the
sample companies.  Prior studies suggest that managers do listen to dissent
voting and often follow through by effecting changes in the firm’s govern-
ance policies.24
I. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING AND RESEARCH QUESTION
A. Institutional Setting
The literature has widely acknowledged the fact that CTs—more gen-
erally known as related-party transactions—have been used by corporate
insiders to expropriate wealth from outsiders.  Following Ryngaert and
Thomas, the wealth expropriation situation denotes firm insiders and ma-
jority shareholders using related-party transactions to extract wealth from
outsiders; the “[e]xpropriation occurs if the firm receives less net benefit
from an RPT than could have been obtained from an arm’s-length transac-
tion.”25  This expropriation risk has been acknowledged widely in the liter-
ature including the case of Hong Kong.26  With the purpose of protecting
minority shareholders from wealth expropriation, the SEHK listing rules
have required that shareholders of the listed issuer approve CT proposals
in general meeting.27
According to the SEHK Listing Rules, CTs are transactions between a
listed issuer and a connected person.  A listed issuer denotes a company
24. J. Cai & R. Walkling, Electing Directors, 64 J. FIN. 2389 (2009); Paul E. Fischer et
al., Investor Perceptions of Board Performance: Evidence from Uncontested Director Elec-
tions, 48 J. ACCT. & ECON. 172 (2009); Yermack, supra note 1; see Illiev et al., supra note 17,
at 2198–99.
25. Michael Ryngaert & Shawn Thomas, Not All Related Party Transactions (RPTs)
Are the Same: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post RPTs, 50 J. ACCT. RES. 845, 848 (2012).
26. See Goo & Weber, supra note 22.
27. KHEX Main Board Listing Rule 14A.36 [Rules Governing the Listing of Securi-
ties on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited] (Updated July 22, 2016) http://en-
glish1.english.gov.cn/official/2013-03/11/content_2351644.htm (China). (This is a general
principle that is complemented with a number of exceptions) (hereinafter cited as SEHK
Listing Rule).
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listed in the SEHK or its wholly owned subsidiary.  A connected person
includes, among others, a director, chief executive officer, or substantial
shareholder of the listed issuer and their associates.28  CTs can be of dif-
ferent types such as when a connected person purchases from the listed
issuer (or sells to the listed issuer) assets, shares, good or services; or when
a connected person benefits from loans or guarantees provided by the
listed issuer.29  CTs are widely conducted in both developed and develop-
ing countries, including Hong Kong.30  Data from the SEHK showed that
companies listed therein announced on average roughly 2000 CTs yearly
during the period 2009–2014. Of those, about 450 were required to obtain
shareholder approval.
The process of seeking shareholder approval has two core steps.  In the
first step, the listed issuer must prepare and send a circular document to
the shareholders.31  The circular document contains a detailed explanation
and evaluation of the CT, as well as an opinion letter issued by an inde-
pendent financial adviser (“IFA”) with a voting recommendation.32  This
letter is aimed at the Independent Board Committee (“IBC”) and at
shareholders entitled to vote on the CT proposal.  The IBC is appointed
by the board of the listed issuer and is composed of independent non-
executive directors who do not have an interest in the CT.  In the circular,
the IBC will also issue a letter of opinion in relation to the merits of the
CT proposal and recommend whether shareholders should vote in favor of
the proposal.33
The second step for approval consists in shareholders voting on the CT
proposal.34  The CT proposal must be approved by poll voting and, as a
general rule, by passing an ordinary resolution that requires the number of
“for” votes be greater than 50 percent of the total votes cast (votes for +
votes against).35  Under some circumstances, the call for a general meeting
can be waived and shareholders may approve the CT proposal through the
process of written resolution.36  Shortly after this vote has ended, the poll
result is publicly announced and made available on the SEHK website.
It must be noted that the presence of a controlling shareholder has
been cited as a factor often precluding the role that minority shareholders
can play in the governance of the company, including the monitoring
role.37  Because ownership is highly concentrated in a large fraction of the
28. Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Rule 14.A.07–08.
29. Cheung et al., supra note 22, at 349.
30. OECD, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2004), supra note 5, at 52.
31. Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Listing Rule 14A.46.
32. Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Listing Rule 14A.39, 14A.44–45.
33. Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Listing Rule 14A.45.
34. Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Listing Rule 14A.36.
35. Companies Ordinance, (2017) Cap. 622, 1, § 563 (H.K.).
36. Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Listing Rule 14A.37.
37. ONC Lawyers Conference, Shareholder Engagement and Activism in Hong Kong,
Hong Kong (2016).
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companies listed in the SEHK, it is likely that minority shareholders in
those companies do face this type of constraints. In the context of the vot-
ing of CT proposals, however, a mechanism has come to the rescue of
minority shareholders, the so-called vote by disinterested shareholders.38
Under this mechanism, not all the shares with voting rights are entitled to
vote on CT proposals.  Only the group of disinterested shares (sharehold-
ers that do not have a material interest in the CT proposal) can do so:
“The connected transaction must be conditional on shareholders’ approval
at a general meeting held by the listed issuer. Any shareholder who has a
material interest in the transaction must abstain from voting on the
resolution.”39
Voting by means of the mechanism of “disinterested shareholders”
does, at least in theory, empower minority shareholders by, among other
situations, neutralizing the power of the controlling shareholder whenever
it acts in the role of connected person.  As such, this voting mechanism
provides IOs and other minority shareholders with a greater incentive to
attend the general meeting and, eventually, exercise their role as monitors
of managerial discretion.
B. Research Questions
This study aims at investigating whether institutional ownership in
Hong Kong-listed companies is associated with more dissent voting of CT
proposals in general meetings, and thereby, with greater monitoring of
management.  As mentioned in the previous subsection, although CTs
may affect the firm value either positively or negatively, those transactions
have been a popular vehicle in Asia by means of which corporate insiders
have expropriated wealth from minority shareholders.40  In a context of
voting on CT proposals in general meetings, the risk of expropriation may
work as an incentive for minority shareholders, including IOs, to vote
against the proposal.
Prior literature suggests that institutional investors are more likely to
monitor company management than individual investors because individ-
ual investors’ trades are driven to a greater extent by  liquidity concerns or
speculation,41 while institutional investors are more sophisticated and
38. See Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Listing Rule 14A.36.
39. Id.
40. See Cheung et al., supra note 22.
41. See, e.g., Terrence Odean, Do Investors Trade Too Much?, 89 AM. ECON. REV.
1279, 1284 (1999); Brad M. Barber & Terrence Odean, Common Stock Investment Perform-
ance of Individual Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773, 795 (2000); Brad M. Barber & Terrence Odean,
All That Glitters: The Effects of Attention and News on the Buying Behavior of Individual and
Institutional Investors, 21 REV. FIN. STUD. 785 (2007); Mark Grinblatt & Matti Keloharju,
The Investment Behavior and Performance of Various Investor Types: A Study of Finland’s
Unique Data Set, 55 J. FIN. ECON. 43 (2000); Brad M. Barber et al., Just How Much Do
Individual Investors Lose by Trading?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 609 (2009).
230 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 7:221
powerful given their (on average) larger shareholdings.42  On the other
hand, a stream of research suggests that institutional owners do not neces-
sarily have incentives to monitor.43  One method of directly observing
monitoring activity by IOs is to look at their voting conduct.  Because such
an observation is unavailable in Hong Kong, evidence in this study relies
on the following association:
1) Is dissent voting on CT proposals more pronounced in companies
with IOs than in companies without IOs?
 Next, we bring in critical factors of corporate law and governance in
Hong Kong that may affect the relationship between institutional owner-
ship and dissent voting on CT proposals.  Institutional investors in Hong
Kong-listed companies are largely minority shareholders permeable to the
effects of CTs or to the conduct of controlling shareholders.  We include
two additional analyses to provide corroborating evidence on the monitor-
ing role of IOs.  First, we expect that IOs are able to differentiate between
CTs that are beneficial to the firm and CTs that are detrimental to the
well-being of the firm, and thus, are more likely to engage in dissent voting
for CTs that are likely to expropriate minority shareholders.  As such, we
ask the following question:
2) Is the association between IOs and dissent voting different when
the CT proposals are likely to expropriate?
Second, the probability of institutional monitoring through dissent vot-
ing is likely to work only in an environment where dissent voting may
convey a meaningful signal of monitoring.  In cases where the manage-
ment is dominated by a controlling shareholder, the CTs are likely to pass
regardless of the presence of a dissent voting, and as such, the incentive of
IOs to monitor may be weaker.  As such, this investigation asks the follow-
ing question:
3) Is the association between IOs and dissent voting different when
the CT’s issuer has a controlling shareholder?
42. For example, see John R. Hand, A Test of The Extended Functional Fixation Hy-
pothesis, 65 ACCT. REV. 740 (1990); Louis Chan & Josef Lakonishok, The Behavior of Stock
Prices Around Institutional Trades, 50 J. FIN. 1147 (1995); Beverly R. Walther, Investor So-
phistication and Market Earnings Expectation, 35 J. ACCT. RES. 157 (1997); Eli Bartov et al.,
Investor Sophistication and Patterns in Stock Returns After Earnings Announcements, 75
ACCT. REV. 43 (2000); Sugato Chakravarty, Stealth-Trading: Which Traders’ Trades Move
Prices, 61 J. FIN. ECON. 289 (2001); Richard W. Sias et al., Changes in Institutional Ownership
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43. For example, see Brian J. Bushee, Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term
Earnings Over Long-Run Value?, 18 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 207 (2001); Clifford J. Holder-
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II. MODEL SPECIFICATION
In order to address the research questions defined in the previous sec-
tion of this article, the following equation was estimated:
VAR = b0 + b1[INSTOWN] + [control variables] + e
The dependent variable VAR denoted the “Voting Approval Rate” of
CT proposals.  Approval rate levels resulting from the voting of CT pro-
posals were used in this model as a proxy for monitoring (lower approval
rates are associated with higher dissent voting and greater monitoring).
The variable INSTOWN represented institutional ownership and was
given two different definitions.
In the first definition, INSTOWN_D was a dummy variable that
equaled 1 if the firm has IOs and 0 otherwise.  The group of firms without
IOs works here as a control group.  In order to account for varying levels
of institutional ownership, different versions of the variable INSTOWN_D
were constructed. In particular, the dummy variables INSTOWN_D1, IN-
STOWN_D5, and INSTOWN_D15 equaled 1 if the IO held at least 1, 5, or
15 percent, respectively, of the outstanding shares of the company, and
equaled 0 otherwise.
In the second definition, the variable INSTOWN equaled the total per-
centage of outstanding shares held by IOs in the company.  For companies
without IOs, the variable INSTOWN equaled 0.  Unlike the dummy varia-
ble INSTOWN_D that allocated the value of 1 to each and all companies
having IOs, the INSTOWN variable accounted for the variations in the
total percentage of outstanding shares held by IOs for each company.  By
disaggregating shareholdings in INSTOWN, moreover, our study built
other subgroup variables in order to account for different characteristics of
IOs, including, among other characteristics: whether the institutional in-
vestor is local or foreign and the types of investor  (see Table no. 1 on
definitions).
In order to measure how the presence of expropriation risk affected
the interplay between VAR and INSTOWN, regressions of VAR on IN-
STOWN were conducted in separate groups of CTs depending on whether
a priori the CTs were likely to expropriate or, instead, were likely benefi-
cial.  In order to identify CTs that were likely to expropriate or to be bene-
ficial, two different measures were utilized, as explained below.
The first measure was CT_ONEOFF (dummy variable) that relied on
the distinction between one-off CTs (likely to expropriate) and continuing
CTs (likely beneficial).  This distinction finds justification in the SEHK
listing rules.  The continuing CTs involve the provision of goods or ser-
vices that are carried out on a continuing or recurring basis and are ex-
pected to extend over a period that must not exceed three years.44  These
CTs are usually transactions made in the ordinary and usual course of bus-
iness of the issuer, and they are subject to more stringent disclosure rules,
44. Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Listing Rules 14A.31, 14A.52.
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including a requirement for annual reporting of continuing CTs and extra
supervision of such CTs by an auditor and by independent non-executive
directors.45
Compared with the one-off CTs, the continuing CTs are more likely to
prove beneficial and are unlikely to expropriate.  The extra disclosure and
monitoring by the issuer of a continuing CT, the long-term business rela-
tionships that this type of CT creates, as well as the familiarity of the par-
ties with the contracting terms and the contract’s performance46 may also
foster efficient contracting.47
The second measure used to identify whether a CT was beneficial or
likely to expropriate relied on the market reaction, namely cumulative ab-
normal returns (“[-1, +3] CAR”) at the time of the public announcement
of the CT proposal (“CAR_A”).  In order to separate the data sample in
groups, a dummy variable was built, namely CAR_AD, which equaled 1 if
the market reaction was negative (likely to expropriate) and equaled 0 if
the market reaction was positive (likely beneficial).  The maintained as-
sumption is that the market helps identify whether the CTs proposed are
likely to benefit or likely to expropriate the firm.48
In order to identify the effects from the presence of a controlling share-
holder on the interplay between VAR and INSTOWN, regressions of
VAR on INSTOWN were conducted in separate groups of CTs depending
on whether the listed issuer had a controlling shareholder.  The dummy
variable CONTROLLING_SHARE identified the group of firms with
(equaled 1) and without (equaled 0) a controlling shareholder.
A set of control variables were included in the regression in order to
account for covariate imbalances (see table no. 2 on summary statistics)
and to mitigate omitted variable problems.  These variables reflect charac-
teristics of the listed issuers, of the CT proposals, and of a listed issuer’s
voting process in general meeting (see table no. 1 on definitions).
III. DATA SOURCES AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
Data on CT proposals are publicly available from the SEHK website.
Circular documents and poll results for each one of the identified CTs
were utilized to hand-collect data on the characteristics of CT proposals
and voting.  Unfortunately, no publicly available data was found on each
voter’s identity and vote cast.  These data are not disclosed in Hong Kong
by either institutional investors or listed companies.  For this reason, infer-
ences with regards to the actual voting behavior of IOs were not drawn in
45. Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Listing Rules 14A.31, 14A.49, 14A.55, 14A.56.
46. Very often the approval of a new continuing CT in the general meeting consists of
a mere renewal of an otherwise expiring continuing CT, which gives the company a better
understanding of the track record and past performance of the CT deal.
47. Ryngaert & Thomas, supra note 25, at 848–49.
48. Cheung et al., supra note 22.
Spring 2018] Do Institutional Owners Monitor? 233
this study that focused only on the association between firms’ level of insti-
tutional ownership and voting approval rates.
Data on the ownership structure of Hong Kong-listed companies were
collected using Thomson-One (Ownership) database which provides data
on the equity holdings of institutional investors in listed companies world-
wide (including Hong Kong-listed companies).  This database reports on
the percentage shareholdings of institutional investors for each listed com-
pany and breaks these data down by investor’s type and place of incorpo-
ration. Company data were collected from Capital IQ.
The original sample consisted of 108 CT proposals publicly announced
in the SEHK and subject to shareholder approval. A month of the year,
December, was selected randomly. The last 36 CTs announced publicly in
December were collected for the period 2012–14. A few observations were
excluded from the original sample: eight CTs had qualified for a general
meeting waiver exception;49 two CTs could not be adequately categorized
(the voting was aimed at a bundle of CTs); a CT was mistakenly repeated;
and in one CT the performance of the listed issuer was a clearly an outlier.
Consequently, our final sample consisted of 96 CT proposals. Of those, 76
were submitted for a vote in listed issuers with IOs, whereas the rest were
voted in listed issuers without IOs. This latter group (20 CT proposals)
served as a control group in the regression analysis (see Table no.2 on
summary statistics).
Next, the 96 CT proposals were voted by shareholders in extraordinary
general meetings.  On average only 56 percent of outstanding shares had
the right to vote on the specific CT by meeting the condition of indepen-
dent or disinterested shares (44 percent of outstanding shares were ex-
cluded from the voting due to the existence of material interest).  Of this
56 percent, only 37 percent were effectively present at the general meet-
ing, showing low levels of voting turnout.  Approval rates in terms of ma-
jority of votes cast (shares voting for/shares voting for and against) was
very high: 98.3 percent on average with no significant difference between
groups with and without IOs.  Although no CT proposal in our sample was
rejected by the vote of disinterested shareholders, dissenting votes were
cast in 52.1 percent of the CT proposals (dummy variable DISSENT-
ING_VOTE).  In all the CT proposals, the IFA had recommended share-
holders vote for the proposal.
In the group of firms with IOs (76 observations), IOs held on average 9
percent of the company’s outstanding shares.  Among types of IOs, the
higher average in terms of holdings corresponded to the category Invest-
ment Advisers (6.7 percent).  Additionally, foreign IOs held 7.8 percent of
the company’s outstanding shares, whereas Hong Kong IOs held only 1.2
percent.
Looking at the characteristics of CT proposals in our sample, 59 per-
cent of them consisted of one-off CTs, the rest were continuing CTs
49. Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Listing Rule 14A.37.
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(CT_ONEOFF).  Sixty-two percent of the CT proposals were concomi-
tantly classified as notifiable proposals for the purposes of the SEHK List-
ing Rules (CT&NT).  In 87 percent of the CT proposals, the connected
person was a substantial shareholder (CP_SSH: shareholder holding at
least 10 percent of the firm’s outstanding shares).  The market reaction
around the announcement of the CT proposals (CAR [-1, +3]) in our sam-
ple was on average negative (-0.003) but—around the release of the circu-
lar document—the market reaction was positive (0.007).
The presence of a controlling shareholder (holding 30 percent or more
of the company’s outstanding shares) was detected in 62.5 percent of the
observations (CONROLLING_SHARE).  The size of the firms was on av-
erage HK$126 billion, and on average, their performances were positive
(0.005).  Ninety-five percent of the firms were listed in the Main Board of
the SEHK, whereas 5 percent listed in the GEM.
When the sample was split into companies with and without IOs, some
of the variables across the two groups showed statistically significant im-
balances (see t-test scores in Table no.2 in regards to TURNOUT,
CT_ONEOFF, CT&NT, CP_SSH, FIRM_MB and others).  To mitigate
biases in the regression estimations arising from those imbalances, all
these variables were included in our regression model as controls.  Regres-
sion were made using Stata software.
IV. REGRESSION ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
We conducted multiple linear regressions in Stata.  Table no. 3 reports
the results from separate regressions of VAR on INSTOWN_D (and on its
various cutoff forms INSTOWN_D1, INSTOWN_D5, and
INSTOWN_D15).
The regression of VAR on INSTOWN_D (dummy variable) was una-
ble to reject the hypothesis that the estimate of INSTOWN_D equaled to
zero value, and hence, the regression identified no monitoring effects.  As
the influence of levels of institutional ownership was allowed through the
use of the various cutoff variables, negative and statistically significant ef-
fects were shown slightly only for the case of INSTOWN_D15 (-0.031; t = -
1.94; p = 0.056).  The analysis suggests that levels of dissent voting were
not different in companies with or without IOs in our sample, except for
the group of companies where IOs owned a large stake in the company (at
least 15 percent).
The outcome variable INSTOWN (continuous variable) was brought
into the analysis because, unlike the dummy variable INSTOWN_D, it al-
lowed the characteristics of IOs to feed into the analysis (as shown in Ta-
ble no. 4).  Note first that the presence of monitoring effects emerged
when VAR was regressed on INSTOWN.  The coefficient of INSTOWN
was negative and significant, suggesting a negative association (negative
slope) between VAR and INSTOWN (-0.002; t = -2.83; p = 0.06).  The
source of this effect—in terms of level of institutional ownership—seems
to be the group of firms where IOs owned 5 percent or more of the issued
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shares (High_INSTOWN: coefficient -0.001; t = -2.61; p-value = 0.011).
The coefficient of Low_INSTOWN was of positive sign and statistically
insignificant.
The presence of local IOs proved more relevant than foreign IOs for
the purpose of monitoring through dissent voting.  The negative and statis-
tically significant coefficient of Local_INSTOWN indicates that dissent
voting is more likely in the presence of local, rather than foreign, investors
in the ownership structure of the sample firms.  Relevant differences were
also found between those investors more able (Indep_INSTOWN) and
less able (Grey_INSTOWN) to resist managers’ pressure.  Although the
magnitude of the estimates and the sign are similar for both groups of
investors, the zero-effect hypothesis could not be rejected for the case of
the Grey_INSTOWN.  Among types of IOs, only investment advisors
(IAs) showed a negative and a significant association with VAR.
In order to corroborate results, additional Probit and Logit regressions
of DISSENTING_VOTE (a dummy variable that equals 1 if the voting
outcome showed a percentage of dissent voting or equals 0 otherwise) on
the different cutoffs of the INSTOWN_D variable were made.  In all those
regressions, the coefficient estimator of INSTOWN showed a positive sign
(consistent with monitoring effects), although statistical significance
emerged only for the cutoff variable INSTOWN_D5 (Logit regression: co-
efficient 1.22, p-value = 0.045; Probit regression: coefficient 0.75 p-value =
0.040).  These regressions were run using the same control variables used
in the multiple linear regressions as shown in Table no. 3.
In Table no. 5 our sample of CT proposals was split into two groups:
(1) CT proposals likely to expropriate (one-off CT proposals) and (2) CT
proposals likely beneficial (continuing CT proposals).  Regression tests of
VAR on INSTOWN_D were conducted separately for each group to eval-
uate the extent to which the presence of expropriation risk in CT propos-
als affected the interplay of VAR and INSTOWN_D.
As shown in Table no. 5, the study identified monitoring effects only
for the group of CT proposals likely to expropriate but not for those likely
beneficial.  For the group of CT proposals likely to expropriate, the coeffi-
cient of INSTOWN_D showed a negative sign consistently across regres-
sions.  The estimates acquired statistical significance for variables
INSTOWN_D5 and INSTOWN_D15.  These results suggest that compa-
nies with IOs exercise greater monitoring through dissent voting than
companies without IOs when the CT proposals were likely to expropriate
and the IOs held at least 5 percent shareholdings. Consistently, when the
outcome variable INSTOWN was used (Table no.6), the coefficient of
High_INSTOWN was of negative sign and highly significant (-0.004; t =
4.39).
When CAR_AD was used to proxy for CT proposal likely to bring
expropriation or benefit (in place of the distinction one-off versus continu-
ing CT proposals) (Table no. 7), the estimates of INSTOWN_D showed
consistently a negative relationship between VAR and INSTOWN_D for
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the group of CT proposals likely to expropriate but statistical.  Statistical
significance, however, was slightly achieved only for the group of compa-
nies with IOs holding at least 15 percent of the outstanding shares (IN-
STOWN_D15 = -0.052; t = 1.77, p = 0.083). When this investigation used
the INSTOWN variable (Table no. 8), the results showed the presence of
monitoring effects more clearly in the group of CT proposals likely to ex-
propriate (High_INSTOWN = -0.002; t = 2.54).  By contrast, no monitor-
ing effects emerged from the regressions of VAR on INSTOWN_D, and of
VAR on INSTOWN, for the group of CT proposals likely beneficial.
Results from additional Probit and Logit regressions of DISSENT-
ING_VOTE on INSTOWN_D, and its several cutoff variables, delivered
similar outcomes.  Although in all these regressions the coefficients
showed a positive sign, statistical significance was achieved only by the
coefficient of INSTOWN_D5 for the group of CT proposals likely to ex-
propriate, both as denoted by CT_ONEOFF (Logit regression: coefficient
= 3.32, p-value = 0.030; Probit regression: coefficient = 2.05, p-value =
0.027) and as denoted by CAR_AD (Logit regression: coefficient = 4.65;
p-value 0.005; Probit regression: coefficient = 2.77, p-value = 0.003).
Overall, the regression analyses in this section suggest that monitoring
effects through dissent voting—namely the negative relationship between
vote approval rates (“VAR”) and institutional ownership levels—in com-
panies with IOs were detected in our sample for the group of CT propos-
als that were likely to expropriate but not for the group of CT proposals
likely beneficial.  Those monitoring effects emerged for the group of listed
issuers having at least 5percent ownership held by IOs.
Regressions of VAR on INSTOWN_D were run separately in other
two different groups of CT proposals: the first group was characterized by
the presence of a controlling shareholder whereas the second group had
no controlling shareholder (CONTROLLING_SHARE).50  The same re-
gressions were run using the variable INSTOWN instead of
INSTOWN_D.51
From regressions of VAR on the INSTOWN_D, the presence of moni-
toring effects appeared to be more likely in the group of companies with-
out a controlling shareholder as indicated by the coefficient estimate of
variable INSTOWN_D5, which rejected the hypothesis of zero coefficient
(-0.029; t = 2.61).  By contrast, the study found no statistically significant
results in the group of firms with a controlling owner.  These results sug-
gest that the presence of a controlling shareholder is a relevant factor in-
fluencing the interplay of IOs and monitoring effects.
The regressions illustrated in Table no. 10 corroborated these results.
In Table no. 10, the coefficient of High_INSTOWN is negative and signifi-
cant for the group of firms without controlling owners but non-significant
for the group of firms having controlling shareholders.  Statistical signifi-
50. Infra Table 9.
51. Infra Table 10.
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cance, however, was not achieved in any one of the Probit and Logit re-
gressions when the sample was split into groups representing companies
with and without controlling shareholders.
V. DISCUSSION
Academic literature suggests that IOs have challenged management in
general meetings.  Brickley et al. found that the average IO has posed con-
straints on management through dissent voting.52  The study shows, rela-
tive to other classes of shareholders, IOs are more likely to oppose bad
(value decreasing) antitakeover amendment proposals.  The work of Ng et
al. suggests that monitoring effects by IOs are also present.53  The authors
relied on US data to measure the impact of a regulation issued by the US
Securities and Exchange Commission, making the requirement of share-
holder approval mandatory for equity-based management compensation
plan proposals.  Ng et al. found that managers submitted less value de-
creasing proposals to the approval of shareholders after the introduction
of the new regulation (ex-ante effects), whereas in general meetings share-
holders vetoed more proposals (ex-post effects).  In the context of non-US
firms around the world, Iliev et al. found that IOs have, in different de-
grees, voted against management-sponsored proposals, especially when
the IOs feared expropriation.54
The findings from our investigation only aligned partially with those
from the studies described above.  On average, our investigation showed
voting approval rates of CT proposals to be similar in companies with and
without IOs.  But monitoring effects through dissent voting emerged con-
sistently in our sample when the level of ownership by institutional inves-
tors was at least 5 percent and the CT proposals, subject to vote, were
likely to expropriate value from insiders.  To an extent, this finding sug-
gests that IOs can distinguish a priori CT proposals that are value enhanc-
ing from those that are value destroying and that monitoring efforts are
allocated to preclude expropriation.
Academic literature also highlights that CTs can be harmful or benefi-
cial.  A good example of CTs with expropriation effects, or value decreas-
ing effects, is provided by a study conducted by La Porta et al.  In this
study, 20 percent of bank loans in Mexico were made to firms that fell into
the category of related-parties.  After analyzing the terms of lending, the
authors found that, compared with arm’s-length loans, related-party loans
carried lower interest rates, higher risk of default, and lower recovery
rates (in the case of defaulted loans).55  This evidence pointed at the pres-
52. Brickley et al., supra note 15.
53. Ng et al., supra note 15.
54. Iliev et al., supra note 17, at 2198–99.
55. Rafal La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Guillermo Zamarripa, Related
Lending, 118 Q. J. ECON. 231, 231–68 (2003).
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ence of expropriation effects to the advantage of insiders, yet to the detri-
ment of depositors and to the bank’s minority shareholders.
In other instances, CTs may prove beneficial. Cheung et al. posit that
CTs that consist of cash receipts and are undertaken between parties with
subsidiary relationships can benefit the issuer as, for example, where a
parent company bails out a struggling subsidiary via propping when no
other outside party would help.56  Occasionally, RPTs constitute efficient
arrangements whereby the ‘related or connected’ element creates an ad-
vantage to the contracting parties compared with an arm’s-length transac-
tion.57  Cheng et al. formulate an example CT where an executive (lessor)
who owns a commercial property leases this property to the company (ten-
ant) that she works for.  In the example, the price of the lease is set to
cover the expected losses from a tenant breaking the lease.  The execu-
tive’s position and her firm-specific knowledge allows her to price this risk
better than an unrelated party and, consequently, charge a lower price.58
Once the distinction between CT proposals likely to expropriate, on
the one hand, and CT proposals likely beneficial, on the other hand, were
incorporated into the analysis, it became reasonable to expect greater
monitoring effects for the group of harmful CT proposals, and vice-versa.
Evidence from our investigation supports the view that in the presence of
expropriation risk (voting of CT proposal likely to expropriate) monitor-
ing effects are more evident when IOs own at least a 5 percent stake in the
company.  Below that threshold, no association was found.  Notably, this
finding supports the results in Iliev et al. that showed a positive association
between dissent voting by US IOs and a proposal’s expected expropriation
effects.59  Our evidence is, however, less consistent with findings from
other studies.
Burch, Morgan and Wolf, for example, examined shareholders’ voting
outcomes in 209 takeover proposals for the period 1990–2000 in the
United States.  Their results showed that firms with higher institutional
ownership were associated with higher approval rates even when the sam-
ple contained 70 percent of value-decreasing merger proposals.60
Hamdani and Yafeh investigated the voting patterns of IOs on executive
compensation and self-dealing proposals in firms with concentrated own-
ership in Israel and found that investors seldom voted ‘against’ those pro-
posals.61  The vote against these proposals was even weaker where the
proposal involved self-dealing transactions and where the institutional in-
vestor showed some conflict of interest with the insider (in terms of busi-
ness ties or ownership).
56. Cheung et al., supra note 22, at 355–56.
57. Ryngaert & Thomas, supra note 25, at 851.
58. Id. at 849.
59. Iliev et al., supra note 17, at 2170.
60. Burch et al., supra note 15, at 51.
61. Hamdani & Yafeh, supra note 19.
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In our investigation, monitoring effects were also detected in compa-
nies with a high level of institutional ownership and without a controlling
shareholder. In the presence of a controlling shareholder, however, our
research failed to observe any monitoring effects even when the group of
CT proposals issued by the companies having a controlling shareholder
contained expropriation risk.  This group of CT proposals was composed
of 34 one-off CTs and 24 continuing CTs, with the average CAR value for
the group being negative (-0.012).62
One plausible explanation for the want of monitoring effects despite
the existence of expropriation risk is the presence of a controlling share-
holder may have worked as a disincentive for active IOs—minority share-
holders in our sample of Hong Kong-listed companies—to monitor
through dissent voting.  Another explanation may be the presence of a
controlling shareholder in a firm simply makes such a firm less attractive
to more active investors.  Monitoring by IOs could also have taken place
through private, unobservable negotiations prior to the voting in general
meeting.63  Regardless, the evidence suggests that monitoring through dis-
sent voting on CT proposals was weaker when IOs and a controller share-
holder cohabitated in the listed issuer.
This result also suggests that the mechanism of voting by disinterested
shareholders, as currently applied to the vote of CT proposals in Hong
Kong has not effectively strengthened the vote of minority shareholders
when the company has a controlling shareholder.  As mentioned earlier in
this article, this voting mechanism is meant to empower minority share-
holders and, to an extent, neutralize the power of the controlling share-
holder whenever acting in the role of connected person.  Our findings
provide further empirical support to existing views that have contested the
effectiveness of the ‘disinterested shareholder’ voting mechanism in Hong
Kong.
Cheung et al. argued that the shareholder vote requirement in CT pro-
posals is ineffective in protecting firm value for those CTs that are a-priori
likely to result in expropriation of the minority shareholders.64  As a re-
sult, the authors suggest a narrow scope of definition for connected per-
son.  More recently, this view has been echoed in the work of Enriques
that cited the case of Hong Kong to illustrate insincere voting by share-
holders.  Enriques argues, “In the absence of broad-scope rules on who is
disqualified from voting, MOM [majority of the minority] approval may
62. The level of expropriation risk was not different between the group of CT propos-
als issued by firms with a controlling member and the group of CT proposals issued by firms
without such a member as measured in terms of the CAR_A or CT_ONEOFF variables.
63. See Frank M. K. Wong, Shareholder Engagement and Activism Under the Radar:
Empirical Evidence from Hong Kong (2003–15) — Rethinking Disclosure of Interests Regime
15, (Hong Kong Shareholder Engagement and Activism Conf., June 23, 2017), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2725318.
64. Cheung et al., supra note 22.
240 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 7:221
just pay lip service to minority shareholder protection.”65  According to
these views, the mechanism of disinterested shareholders would be insuffi-
cient to preclude wealth expropriation by controlling shareholders.
There are limitations to the investigation and results reported in this
article.  By looking at the association between firms’ institutional owner-
ship and their voting approval rates, one cannot draw inferences with re-
gards to the actual voting behavior of IOs.  As mentioned earlier, the
absence of publicly available data prevented us from making inferences
that account for the identity of the voter and for the direction of the vote
cast; these results are not disclosed by institutional investors or by listed
companies in Hong Kong.  A number of factors that may have influenced
voting behavior and outcomes—such as, the role of independent financial
advisers in providing voting recommendations to shareholders or the role
of media financial reporters in influencing investors’ decisions—have not
been included in the regression analysis due to available resources.  Self-
selection problems may also be present to the extent that it is unlikely that
IOs picked up firms where to invest in (the sample of issuers in our
dataset) at random.
For all the reasons cited above, the relationships between variables in
this investigation have been phrased in terms of correlations or associa-
tions, without pursuing the more challenging goal of identifying cause-ef-
fect relationships.
CONCLUSION
This research investigated the question of whether the presence of IOs
in Hong Kong-listed companies has been associated with greater monitor-
ing of management through dissent voting.  The conventional view in
Hong Kong has been that IOs tend to be passive owners and, conse-
quently, that they exercise little, if any, monitoring over the company’s
management.  This investigation has produced evidence that partially re-
jects this proposition.  In companies with IOs holding at least 5 percent of
the issued shares, monitoring effects were detected when the CT proposals
subject to the vote of shareholders in general meeting were likely to ex-
propriate value or when the company holding the vote on the CT proposal
did not have a controlling shareholder.  Our findings support the view that
the presence of institutional ownership in Hong Kong can be consistent
with monitoring and, to that extent, with good corporate governance.
65. Luca Enriques, Related Party Transactions: Policy Options and Real-World Chal-
lenges (with a Critique of the European Commission Proposal), 16 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 1,
16 (2015).
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Voting approval rate: number of 
votes cast for the proposal 
relative to the sum of the number 
of votes cast for and against 
[Burch, Morgan and Wolf (2004); 
Thomas and Cotter (2007); 
Armstrong, Gow and Larcker 
(2013)] 
[DISSENTING_VOTE] 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the voting outcome shows 
dissent votes (voting outcome is 
approved by less than 100% of 
votes cast); equals 0 if the voting 
outcome shows no dissent votes 
(CT proposal approved by a 
100% of the votes cast) 
[TURNOUT] 
Portion of shares, among all 
disinterested shares with the 
right to vote on a particular CT, 
that effectively attended the vote 
of that CT in GM 
[SHARES_DISINT] 
Percentage shares whose 
holders do not have a material 
interest in the RPT; the holders 
of these shares are entitled to 
attend and vote on the CT in the 
GM (attendance and voting is 
however voluntary subject to 
quorum and majority 
requirements). Interested shares 
are excluded from the voting of a 
CT in the general meeting 
(majority of the minority system); 
Interested shares are shares 
whose holders have a material 
interests in the CT; the holders of 
these shares must abstain from 
voting in the GM; only 
disinterested shares provide to 




Equals 1 if the listed issuer 
(company) has institutional 
owners; equals 0 if the company 
has no institutional owners 
[INSTOWN] 
Percentage of outstanding 
shares in the listed issuer owned 
by institutional investors; equals 
0 if the company has no 
institutional investors 
[Low_INSTOWN] 
Percentage of outstanding 
shares in the listed issuer owned 
by institutional investors that hold 
less than 5% ownership; 
otherwise equals 0 
[High_INSTOWN] 
Percentage of outstanding 
shares in the listed issuer owned 
by institutional investors that hold 
5% or more ownership; otherwise 
equals 0 
[SWF_INSTOWN] 
Percentage of outstanding 
shares in the listed issuer owned 
by sovereign wealth funds; 
otherwise equals 0 
[IAs_INSTOWN] 
Percentage of outstanding 
shares in the listed issuer owned 
by investment advisers including 
hedge funds; otherwise equals 0 
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Table no. 1: Definition of Variables for Regression Analysis 
Theme Variable Definitions 
[PensionF_INSTOWN] 
Percentage of outstanding 
shares in the listed issuer owned 
by pension funds; otherwise 
equals 0 
[B&T_INSTOWN] 
Percentage of outstanding 
shares in the listed issuer owned 
by banks and trusts; otherwise 
equals 0 
[PrivateE_INSTOWN] 
Percentage of outstanding 
shares in the listed issuer owned 
by private equity; otherwise 
equals 0 
[Foreign_INSTOWN] 
Percentage of outstanding 
shares in the listed issuer owned 
by foreign institutional investors; 
otherwise equals 0 
[Local_INSTOWN] 
Percentage of outstanding 
shares in the listed issuer owned 
by local institutional investors; 
otherwise equals 0 
[Indep_INSTOWN] 
Percentage of outstanding 
shares in the listed issuer owned 
by investment advisers (mutual 
funds and hedge funds) (Ferreira 
and Matos, 2008) 
[Grey_INSTOWN] 
Percentage of outstanding 
shares in the listed issuer owned 
by SWF, Pension Funds, Bank & 
Trust, and Private Equity 
(Ferreira and Matos, 2008) 
Characteristics of Connected 
Transactions 
[CT_ONEOFF] 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the CT is a one-off CT (CT 
proposal likely to expropriate); 
equals 0 if the CT is a continuing 
CT (CT proposal likely beneficial) 
[CT&NT] 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the CT proposal is not 
categorized as a Notifiable 
Transaction; equals 0 if the CT 
proposal is also a Notifiable 
Transaction 
CP_SSH 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the connected person in a CT 
proposal is a substantial 
shareholder of the listed issuer; 
equals 0 otherwise 
Market Reaction 
[CAR_A] 
Market valuation around the 
announcement of the CT 
proposal in the Stock Exchange 
of Hong Kong in terms of  
Cumulative Abnormal Returns [-
1, +3] 
[CAR_C] 
Market valuation around the 
announcement of the CT 
proposal's circular document in 
the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong in terms of Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns [-1, +3] 
[CAR_AD] 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the market shows a negative 
reaction around the 
announcement of the CT 
proposal (CT proposal likely to 
expropriate); equals 0 if the 
market reaction is positive (CT 
proposal likely beneficial) 
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Table no. 1: Definition of Variables for Regression Analysis 
Theme Variable Definitions
[CAR_CD] 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the market shows a negative 
reaction around the 
announcement of the CT 
proposal's circular document (CT 
proposal likely to expropriate); 
equals 0 if the market reaction is 
positive (CT proposal likely 
beneficial) 
Listed Issuer 
[CONTROLLING  _SHARE] 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the company has a shareholder 
holding 30% or more of 
outstanding shares; equals 0 
otherwise 
[FIRM MB] 
Dummy variable that equals 1 of 
the company is listed in the Main 
Board of the SEHK; equals 0 if 
the company is listed in the 
Growth Enterprise Market of the 
SEHK 
[FIRM       PERFORMANCE] 
(ROA): performance of the 
company (listed issuer) 
measured by return on assets 
(EBIT/total assets) 
[FIRM SIZE] 
Size of the company (listed 
issuer) measured by book assets 
in billion HK$ 
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There was an error in the print version of Table no. 2. 
The corrected Table no. 2 appears on the next page while the 
following pages are left intentionally blank. 
Citations to Table no. 2 should still refer to pages 244-  
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There was an error in the print version of Table no. 2. 
The corrected Table no. 2 appears on the previous page while the 
following pages are left intentionally blank. 
Citations to Table no. 2 should still refer to pages 244-247. 
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There was an error in the print version of Table no. 2. 
The corrected Table no. 2 appears on a previous page while the 
following pages are left intentionally blank. 
Citations to Table no. 2 should still refer to pages 244-247.
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Table no. 3: Regression of VOTE APPROVAL RATE (VAR) on INSTOWN_D A
Independent Variables Dependent Variable: VAR 









CT_ONEOFF -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.044*** -0.041***
(-2.69) (-2.69) (-2.92) (-2.94)
CT&NT -0.028* -0.028* -0.029** -0.027*
(-1.94) (-1.93) (-2.04) (-1.96)
CP_SSH -0.018 -0.017 -0.017 -0.014
(-1.02) (-0.97) (-0.95) (-0.83)
CAR A 0.038 0.036 0.044 0.054
(0.46) (0.44) (0.53) (0.67)
CAR_C -0.090 -0.088 -0.091 -0.100
(-1.06) (-1.06) (-1.11) (-1.23)
SHARES_DISINT -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(-0.06) (-0.08) (-0.12) (-0.13)
TURNOUT 0.018 0.019 0.027 0.029
(0.75) (0.77) (1.06) (1.21)
FIRM_SIZE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.55) (0.57) (0.77) (1.12)
FIRM_PERFORMANCE -0.025 -0.023 -0.013 0.005 
(-0.27) (-0.25) (-0.15) (0.05)
FIRM_MB -0.019 -0.017 -0.016 -0.016
(-0.72) (-0.66) (-0.64) (-0.64)
CONTROLLING_SHARE -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.014
(-0.84) (-0.86) (-0.93) (-1.17)
Obs 96 96 96 96
R-squared 0.1328 0.133 0.145 0.170
A This table presents results for OLS regressions in Stata for the sample of 96 CTs. Table 1 provides denitions for 
the dependent and independent variables. Ttest values are shown in brackets.  
*Signicant at 10% level, 
**Signicant at 5% level,  
***Signicant at 1% level. 
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Table no. 4: Regression of VOTE APPROVAL RATE (VAR) on INSTOWN A
Independent Variables Dependent Variable: VAR 

























CT_ONEOFF -0.042*** -0.045*** -0.041*** -0.044*** -0.047***
(-3.11) (-3.25) (-3.01) (-3.19) (-3.29)
CT&NT -0.025* -0.027* -0.025* -0.026* -0.027*
(-1.85) (-1.97) (-1.84) (-1.90) (-1.89)
CP_SSH -0.013 -0.016 -0.012 -0.012 -0.014
(-0.76) (-0.94) (-0.73) (-0.72) (-0.80)
CAR_A 0.064 0.065 0.047 0.056 0.053
(0.81) (0.82) (0.59) (0.70) (0.65)
CAR_C -0.109 -0.108 -0.092 -0.101 -0.102
(-1.38) (-1.36) (-1.16) (-1.26) (-1.24)
SHARES_DISINT -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.002 -0.004
(-0.23) (-0.29) (-0.23) (-0.09) (-0.17)
TURNOUT 0.040 0.043* 0.040* 0.042* 0.039
(1.65) (1.76) (1.69) (1.70) (1.57)
FIRM_SIZE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.80) (0.88) (0.49) (0.72) (0.14)
FIRM_PERFORMANCE 0.019 0.016 0.034 0.023 0.016
(0.22) (0.18) (0.39) (0.26) (0.17)
FIRM_MB -0.012 -0.017 -0.012 -0.012 -0.014
(-0.48) (-0.67) (-0.51) (-0.50) (-0.55)
CONTROLLING_SHARE -0.015 -0.015 -0.016 -0.015 -0.014
(-1.32) (-1.34) (-1.44) (-1.26) (-1.21) 
Obs 96 96 96 96 96
R-squared 0.209 0.219 0.234 0.214 0.225
A This table presents results for OLS regressions in Stata for the sample of 96 CTs. Table 1 provides denitions for 
the dependent and independent variables. Ttest values are shown in brackets.  
*Signicant at 10% level, 
**Signicant at 5% level,  
***Signicant at 1% level. 
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Table no. 5: Regression of VOTE APPROVAL RATE (VAR) on INSTOWN_D by Groups of One-
off and Continuing CT Proposals A 
 
Independent Variables 
 Dependent Variable: VAR 
 
CTs Likely To Expropriate 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
INSTOWN D  -0.017    
  (-0.82)    
INSTOWN_D1   -0.018   
   (-0.99)   
INSTOWN_D5    -0.056**  
    (-2.45)  
INSTOWN_D15     -0.115*** 
     (-3.74) 
CT&NT  -0.028 -0.029 -0.034** -0.031* 
  (-1.52) (-1.59) (-2.01) (-1.99) 
CP_SSH  -0.011 -0.008 -0.009 -0.006 
  (-0.44) (-0.32) (-0.39) (-0.28) 
CAR_A  0.112 0.139 0.181 0.125 
  (0.85) (1.07) (1.45) (1.10) 
CAR C  -0.140 -0.181 -0.218* -0.163 
  (-1.05) (-1.42) (-1.77) (-1.45) 
SHARES_DISINT  0.010 0.019 0.009 -0.013 
  (0.24) (-0.46) (0.24) (-0.36) 
TURNOUT  0.014 0.019 0.044 0.042 
  (0.36) (0.48) (1.13) (1.19) 
FIRM_SIZE  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 
  (0.55) (0.57) (1.15) (2.07) 
FIRM_PERFORMANCE  -0.050 -0.043 -0.066 -0.008 
  (-0.43) (-0.37) (-0.60) (-0.08) 
FIRM_MB  -0.009 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 
  (-0.30) (-0.23) (-0.22) (-0.27) 
CONTROLLING_SHARE  -0.009 -0.008 -0.011 -0.027 
  (-0.45) (-0.44) (-0.63) (-1.55) 
Obs  57 57 57 57 
R-squared  0.157 0.163 0.245 0.347 
 
Table no. 5: Regression of VOTE APPROVAL RATE (VAR) on INSTOWN_D by Groups of One-
off and Continuing CT Proposals A 
Independent Variables 
 Dependent Variable: VAR 
 
CTs Likely Beneficial 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
INSTOWN_D  0.083***       
  (3.61)       
INSTOWN_D1    0.022     
    (1.25)     
INSTOWN_D5      0.014   
      (0.78)   
INSTOWN_D15        0.005 
         (0.30) 
CT&NT  0.005 -0.006 0.014 -0.016 
  (-0.14) (-0.13) (-0.03) (-0.35) 
CP_SSH  -0.001 -0.017 -0.016 -0.014 
   (-0.05)  (-0.55)  (-0.52)  (-0.45) 
CAR_A  -0.024 -0.061 -0.097 -0.104 
  (-0.26) (-0.56) (-0.92) (-0.96) 
CAR_C  -0.006 -0.013 -0.008 0.008 
  (-0.07) (-0.12) (-0.08) (0.07) 
SHARES_DISINT  0.020 -0.003 -0.011 -0.010 
  (0.76) (0.11) (-0.38) (-0.34) 
TURNOUT  -0.006 0.019 0.019 0.023 
  (-0.26) (0.66) (0.63) (0.78) 
FIRM SIZE  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.35) (0.19) (0.16) (0.26) 
FIRM_PERFORMANCE  0.085 0.085 0.048 0.138 
  (0.49) (0.40) (0.19) (0.62) 
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Table no. 5: Regression of VOTE APPROVAL RATE (VAR) on INSTOWN_D by Groups of One-
off and Continuing CT Proposals A 
Independent Variables 
 Dependent Variable: VAR 
 
CTs Likely Beneficial 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 








CONTROLLING_SHARE  -0.016 -0.010 -0.015 -0.014 
  (-1.22) (-0.65) (-0.97) (-0.88) 
Obs  39 39 39 39 
R-squared  0.389 0.151 0.123 0.106 
 
A This table presents results for OLS regressions in Stata for the sample of 96 CTs broken down in two groups: CTs 
Likely to Expropriate and CTs Likely Beneficial. Table 1 provides denitions for the dependent and independent 
variables. Ttest values are shown in brackets.  
 
*Signicant at 10% level 
 
**Signicant at 5% level 
 
***Signicant at 1% level. 
Table no. 6: Regression of VOTE APPROVAL RATE (VAR) on INSTOWN by Groups of One-off 





CTs Likely To Expropriate 
 
CTs Likely Beneficial   
 (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
INSTOWN   -0.004***     0.000   
    (-4.59)     (0.31)   
Low_INSTOWN     .000     0.008 
      (0.06)     (0.81) 
High_INSTOWN     -0.004***     0.000 
      (-4.39)     (0.38) 
CT&NT   -0.024 -0.025   -0.015 -0.025 
    (-1.58) (-1.67)   (-0.34) (-0.52) 
CP_SSH   -0.005 -0.008   -0.014 -0.014 
     (-0.25)  (-0.39)    (-0.44)  (-0.44) 
CAR_A   0.171 0.165   -0.102 -0.076 
    (1.58) (1.51)   (-0.95) (-0.58) 
CAR_C   -0.202* -0.199*   0.008 0.014 
    (-1.90) (-1.85)   (-0.07) (0.13) 
SHARES_DISINT   -0.002 -0.005   -0.010 -0.006 
    (-0.05) (-0.14)   (-0.33) (-0.21) 
TURNOUT   0.066* 0.065*   0.022 0.029 
    (1.92) (1.90)   (0.74) (0.93) 
FIRM_SIZE   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 
    (1.06) (1.13)   (0.32) (0.41) 
FIRM_PERFORMANCE   -0.009 -0.017   0.133 0.202 
    (-0.09) (-0.17)   (0.58) (0.82) 
FIRM_MB   -0.001 -0.005   - - 
    (-0.03) (-0.018)   - - 
CONTROLLING_SHARE   -0.018 -0.019   -0.013 -0.009 
    (-1.12) (-1.18)   (-0.84) (-0.54) 
Obs   57 57   39 39 
R-squared   0.417 0.424   0.106 0.127 
 
A This table presents results for OLS regressions in Stata for the sample of 96 CTs broken down in two groups: CTs 
Likely to Expropriate and CTs Likely Beneficial. Table 1 provides denitions for the dependent and independent 
variables. Ttest values are shown in brackets.  
 
*Signicant at 10% level 
 
**Signicant at 5% level 
 
***Signicant at 1% level. 
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Table no. 7: Regression of VOTE APPROVAL RATE (VAR) on 
INSTOWN_D by Groups of Positive and Negative Market 
Reaction A 
Independent Variables  [CAR_A(-)] CTs Likely To Expropriate 
      
INSTOWN D   -0.021       
    (-0.91)       
INSTOWN_D1     -0.003     
      (-0.14)     
INSTOWN_D5       -0.033   
        (-1.25)   
INSTOWN_D15         -0.052* 
           (-1.77) 







    (-2.18) (-2.09) (-2.41) (-2.17) 
CT&NT   -0.025 -0.028 -0.025 -0.023 
    (-1.12) (-1.24) (-1.13) (-1.08) 
CP_SSH   -0.022 -0.025 -0.024 -0.027 
     (-0.72)  (-0.77)  (-0.81)  (-0.93) 
SHARES_DISINT   -0.024 -0.027 -0.040 -0.038 
    (-0.44) (-0.50) (-0.74) (-0.73) 
TURNOUT   0.030 0.031 0.063 0.058 
    (0.76) (0.77) (1.33) (1.39) 
FIRM_SIZE   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    (0.52) (0.47) (0.80) (0.91) 
FIRM_PERFORMANCE   -0.023 -0.020 -0.036 -0.001 
    (-0.21) (-0.18) (-0.33) (-0.01) 
FIRM_MB   -0.030 -0.037 -0.038 -0.039 
    (-0.77) (-0.92) (-1.04) (-1.07) 
CONTROLLING_SHARE   -0.022 -0.026 -0.027 -0.028 
    (-1.04) (-1.19) (-1.27) (-1.36) 
Obs   53 53 53 53 
R-squared   0.204 0.189 0.217 0.231 
 
 
Table no. 7: Regression of VOTE APPROVAL RATE (VAR) on 
INSTOWN_D by Groups of Positive and Negative Market 
Reaction A 
Independent Variables  [CAR_A(+)] CTs Likely Beneficial 
      
INSTOWN_D  0.024    
  (1.17)    
INSTOWN_D1   0.004   
   (0.24)   
INSTOWN_D5    -0.012  
    (-0.60)  
INSTOWN_D15     -0.017 
     (-0.82) 
CT_ONEOFF  -0.016 -0.016 -0.022 -0.018 
  (-0.74) (-0.74) (-0.96) (-0.85) 
CT&NT  -0.021 -0.020 -0.024 -0.021 
  (-0.98) (-0.94) (-1.08) (-0.98) 
CP_SSH  -0.014 -0.015 -0.016 -0.012 
  (-0.59) (-0.60) (-0.64) (-0.49) 
SHARES_DISINT  0.013 0.006 0.006 0.006 
  (0.42) (0.19) (0.21) (0.18) 
TURNOUT  0.016 0.021 0.021 0.022 
  (0.41) (0.52) (0.52) (0.56) 
FIRM_SIZE  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.21) (0.24) (0.43) (0.57) 
FIRM_PERFORMANCE  -0.048 -0.022 0.104 0.086 
  (-0.21) (-0.08) (0.36) (0.34) 
FIRM_MB  -0.019 -0.005 0.001 -0.002 
  (-0.48) (-0.12) (-0.02) (-0.06) 
CONTROLLING_SHARE  0.007 0.004 0.000 -0.001 
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Table no. 7: Regression of VOTE APPROVAL RATE (VAR) on 
INSTOWN_D by Groups of Positive and Negative Market 
Reaction A 
Independent Variables  [CAR_A(+)] CTs Likely Beneficial 
  (0.42) (0.25) (-0.01) (-0.08) 
Obs  43 43 43 43 
R-squared  0.097 0.060 0.069 0.077 
 
 
A This table presents results for OLS regressions in Stata for the sample of 96 CTs broken down in two 
groups: CTs Likely to Expropriate and CTs Likely Beneficial. Table 1 provides denitions for the dependent 
and independent variables. T-test values are shown in brackets.  
 
*Signicant at 10% level 
 
**Signicant at 5% level 
 
***Signicant at 1% level. 
Table no. 8: Regression of VOTE APPROVAL RATE (VAR) on INSTOWN by Groups of Positive 
and Negative Market Reaction 
Independent Variables  
[CAR_A(-)] CTs Likely To 
Expropriate  
[CAR_A(+)] CTs Likely 
Beneficial 
  (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
       
INSTOWN  -0.002**   -0.001  
  (-2.65)   (-1.15)  
Low_INSTOWN   0.004   0.009 
   (0.58)   (1.11) 
High_INSTOWN   -0.002**   -0.001 
   (-2.54)   (-1.05) 
CT_ONEOFF  -0.049** -0.050**  -0.018 -0.028 
  (-2.39) (-2.43)  (-0.88) (-1.28) 
CT&NT  -0.021 -0.018  -0.020 -0.032 
  (-0.99) (-0.84)  (-0.94) (-1.39) 
CP_SSH  -0.017 -0.026  -0.012 -0.014 
  (-0.61) (-0.88)  (-0.47) (-0.56) 
SHARES_DISINT  -0.029 -0.037  0.000 -0.004 
  (-0.59) (-0.73)  (0.00) (-0.13) 
TURNOUT  0.078* 0.088*  0.019 0.019 
  (1.90) (2.08)  (0.50) (0.49) 
FIRM_SIZE  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
  (0.57) (0.67)  (0.46) (0.54) 
FIRM_PERFORMANCE  0.003 -0.010  0.153 0.219 
  (0.03) (-0.10)  (0.58) (0.82) 
FIRM_MB  -0.033 -0.043  -0.002 -0.006 
  (-0.94) (-1.17)  (-0.05) (-0.16) 
CONTROLLING_SHARE  -0.028 -0.029  -0.005 -0.007 
  (-1.42) (-1.45)  (-0.29) (-0.39) 
Obs  53 53  43 43 
R-squared  0.305 0.320  0.096 0.137 
 
A This table presents results for OLS regressions in Stata for the sample of 96 CTs broken down in two groups: CTs 
Likely to Expropriate and CTs Likely Beneficial. Table 1 provides denitions for the dependent and independent 
variables. Ttest values are shown in brackets.  
 
*Signicant at 10% level 
 
**Signicant at 5% level 
 
***Signicant at 1% level. 
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Table no. 9: Regression of VOTE APPROVAL RATE (VAR) on INSTOWN_D by Groups 
of Firms With and Without Controlling Shareholders A 
Independent Variables  Controlling Shareholders 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
INSTOWN_D  0.015    
  (0.59)    
INSTOWN_D1   0.008   
   (0.42)   
INSTOWN_D5    -0.002  
    (-0.10)  
INSTOWN_D15     -0.032 
     ( -1.08) 
CT_ONEOFF  -0.055** -0.054** -0.055** -0.058** 
  (-2.12) (-2.08) (-2.06) (-2.23) 
CT&NT  -0.054** -0.051** -0.050** -0.048** 
  (-2.19) (-2.13) (-2.07) (-2.02) 
CP_SSH  -0.010 -0.014 -0.013 -0.009 
  (-0.33) (-0.46) (-0.43) (-0.30) 
SHARES_DISINT  -0.024 -0.027 -0.028 -0.026 
  (-0.50) (-0.57) (-0.59) (-0.55) 
CAR_A  0.100 0.088 0.083 0.100 
  (0.65) (0.58) (0.54) (0.66) 
CAR_C  -0.217 -0.207 -0.198 -0.204 
  (-1.42) (-1.37) (-1.32) (-1.38) 
TURNOUT  0.042 0.041 0.046 0.053 
  (0.98) (0.94) (0.97) (1.25) 
FIRM_SIZE  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.10) (0.08) (0.13) (0.41) 
FIRM_PERFORMANCE  0.004 -0.007 0.004 0.034 
  (0.02) (-0.04) (0.02) (0.19) 
FIRM_MB  -0.042 -0.035 -0.030 -0.029 
  (-0.84) (-0.74) (-0.66) (-0.64) 
Obs  58 58 58 58 




Table no. 9: Regression of VOTE APPROVAL RATE (VAR) on INSTOWN_D by Groups 
of Firms With and Without Controlling Shareholders A 
Independent Variables  Non-Controlling Shareholders 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
INSTOWN_D  -0.007       
  (-0.53)       
INSTOWN_D1    -0.014     
    (-1.15)     
INSTOWN_D5      -0.029**   
      (-2.61)   
INSTOWN_D15        -0.023* 
         (-1.90) 
CT_ONEOFF  -0.027** -0.031** -0.041*** -0.030*** 
  (-2.33) (-2.64) (-3.56) (-2.75) 
CT&NT  0.006 0.006 -0.004 0.003 
  (0.52) (0.52) (-0.35) (0.25) 
CP_SSH  -0.019 -0.018 -0.013 -0.019 
  (-1.15) (-1.20) (-0.97) (-1.34) 
SHARES_DISINT  0.020 0.020 0.018 0.018 
  (0.90) (0.91) (0.90) (0.85) 
CAR_A  -0.033 -0.027 -0.027 -0.013 
  (-0.51) (-0.43) (-0.47) (-0.22) 
CAR_C  0.030 0.010 0.014 0.004 
  (0.45) (0.16) (0.24) (0.07) 
TURNOUT  0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.007 
  (0.07) (-0.04) (0.15) (0.32) 
FIRM_SIZE  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.67) (0.85) (1.58) (1.31) 
FIRM_PERFORMANCE  -0.041 -0.037 -0.012 -0.023 
  (-0.60) (-0.56) (-0.19) (-0.36) 
FIRM_MB  -0.017 -0.010 -0.012 -0.015 
  (-0.89) (-0.50) (-0.67) (-0.85) 
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Table no. 9: Regression of VOTE APPROVAL RATE (VAR) on INSTOWN_D by Groups 
of Firms With and Without Controlling Shareholders A 
Independent Variables  Non-Controlling Shareholders 
Obs  38 38 38 38 
R-squared  0.294 0.321 0.434 0.374 
 
A This table presents results for OLS regressions in Stata for the sample of 96 CTs broken down in two groups: CTs 
voted in firms having a controlling shareholder and CTs voted in firms not having a controlling shareholder. Table 1 
provides denitions for the dependent and independent variables. Ttest values are shown in brackets.  
 
*Signicant at 10% level 
 
**Signicant at 5% level 
 
***Signicant at 1% level. 
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Table no. 10: Regression of VOTE APPROVAL RATE (VAR) on 
INSTOWN by Groups of Firms With and Without Controlling 
Shareholders A 
Independent Variables  Controlling Shareholders 
  (1) (2) 
INSTOWN  -0.002   
  (-1.62)   
Low_INSTOWN    0.006 
    (0.76) 
High_INSTOWN     -0.002 
    (-1.50) 
CT_ONEOFF  -0.053** -0.058** 
  (-2.11) (-2.26) 
CT&NT  -0.042* -0.043* 
  (-1.78) (-1.81) 
CP_SSH  -0.010 -0.016 
  (-0.35) (-0.55) 
SHARES_DISINT  -0.032 -0.038 
  (-0.69) (-0.83) 
CAR_A  0.086 0.113 
  (0.58) (0.75) 
CAR_C  -0.187 -0.196 
  (-1.28) (-1.34) 
TURNOUT  0.071 0.077* 
  (1.59) (1.71) 
FIRM_SIZE  0.000 0.000 
  (0.23) (0.26) 
FIRM_PERFORMANCE  0.046 0.021 
  (0.27) (0.12) 
FIRM_MB  -0.023 -0.031 
  (-0.51) (-0.68) 
Obs  58 58 
R-squared  0.239 0.255 
 
Table no. 10: Regression of VOTE APPROVAL RATE (VAR) on 
INSTOWN by Groups of Firms With and Without Controlling 
Shareholders A 
Independent Variables  Non-Controlling Shareholders 
  (1) (2) 
INSTOWN  -0.001***   
  (-2.90)   
Low_INSTOWN    0.000 
    (0.06) 
High_INSTOWN    -0.001** 
    (-2.64) 
CT_ONEOFF  -0.034*** -0.034*** 
  (-3.27) (-3.22) 
CT&NT  0.003 0.002 
  (0.28) (0.16) 
CP_SSH  -0.018 -0.018 
  (-1.36) (-1.36) 
SHARES_DISINT  0.015 0.015 
  (0.76) (0.76) 
CAR_A  0.004 0.001 
  (0.07) (0.01) 
CAR_C  -0.015 -0.012 
  (-0.27) (-0.20) 
TURNOUT  0.010 0.011 
  (0.51) (0.54) 
FIRM_SIZE  0.000 0.000 
  (1.19) (1.19) 
FIRM_PERFORMANCE  -0.012 -0.010 
  (-0.19) (-0.17) 
FIRM MB  -0.012 -0.013 
  (-0.73) (-0.77) 
Obs  38 38 
R-squared  0.461 0.464 
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A This table presents results for OLS regressions in Stata for the sample of 96 CTs broken down in two groups: 
CTs voted in firms having a controlling shareholder and CTs voted in firms not having a controlling shareholder. 
Table 1 provides denitions for the dependent and independent variables. Ttest values are shown in brackets.  
 
*Signicant at 10% level 
 
**Signicant at 5% level 
 
***Signicant at 1% level. 
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